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Abstract: 
This note examines the behavior of a competitive firm that faces joint price and inflation risk. Given that the price risk is 
negatively correlated with the inflation risk in the sense of expectation dependence, the firm optimally opts for an over-
hedge if the firm's coefficient of relative risk aversion is everywhere no greater than unity. Furthermore, banning the 
firm from forward trading may induce the firm to produce more or less, depending on whether the price risk premium is 
positive or negative, respectively. While the price risk premium is unambiguously negative in the absence of the 
inflation risk, it is not the case when the inflation risk prevails. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, forward hedging 
needs not always promote production should firms take in inflation seriously. 
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1 Introduction
The importance of risk management has inspired empirical and theoretical contributions
to investment, production and consumption decision making under uncertainty. Most of
the literature on economic risk and risk behavior dealing with production and hedging
decisions has incorporated the assumption that firms are concerned about random nominal
wealth denominated in one currency. However, the firms final wealth may also change due
to an unexpected inflation. Therefore, the economic analysis about risk management and
production should be imbedded in a framework of inflation risk.
In some of the theoretical and empirical studies about the impact of inflation risk on
the firm’s behavior it is shown that the celebrated separation theorem holds under the joint
price and inflation risk (see Battermann and Broll 2001, Adam-Mu¨ller 2002a,b). The study
shows further that banning the firm from forward trading may induce the firm to produce
more, a striking result that does not arise if there is no inflation risk.
The purposes of this study are to complement results from the literature, in particular
Adam-Mu¨ller (2002a,b). To determine the firm’s optimal forward position, the concept of
expectation dependence (ED) a` la Wright (1987) is proven to be useful (see also Wong 2012,
2013). While current the hedging literature specifies the inflation risk as a monotonically
decreasing function of the price risk plus noise, expectation dependence provides much more
general bivariate dependence structure. Given that the price risk is negatively correlated
with the inflation risk in the sense of expectation dependence, this note shows that the firm
optimally opts for an over-hedge (under-hedge) should the firm’s coefficient of relative risk
aversion be everywhere no greater (smaller) than unity, which is consistent with the results
in the literature. Our study shows further that the firm optimally produces more or less
in the absence than in the presence of forward hedging, depending on whether the price
risk premium is positive or negative, respectively. In the absence of the inflation risk, the
price risk premium is always negative, thereby rendering the adverse effect on output when
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forward trading is not allowed (Holthausen 1979). When the inflation risk prevails, the
price risk premium can be positive so that forward trading may not promote production in
contrast to the conventional wisdom.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the model of the
competitive risk averse firm under price and inflation risk. Section 3 solves the model and
provides insights for the impact of inflation risk on hedging and production. To determine
the firm’s optimal forward trading, the concept of expectation dependence is employed. The
final section concludes.
2 The model
Consider a competitive firm that operates for one period with two dates, 0 and 1. To begin,
the firm acquires inputs at known nominal prices to produce a single commodity. The
nominal value of inputs at date 1 gives rise to a deterministic cost function, C(Q), where
Q ≥ 0 is the output level chosen by the firm at date 0, C(0) = C ′(0) = 0, and C ′(Q) > 0
and C ′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.1
At date 1, the firm sells its entire output, Q, at the uncertain nominal output price, P˜ .
The firm can hedge against this price risk, P˜ , by selling (purchasing if negative) X units
of its output forward at the known forward price, P f , at date 0. Inflation risk is modeled
by a stochastic purchasing power index, Z˜, with unit mean so that Z˜ − 1 gauges surprises
due to purchasing power changes. The inflation risk, Z˜, is neither hedgeable nor insurable.
The firm’s real income at date 1 is, therefore, given by
Π˜ = Z˜[W + P˜Q+ (P f − P˜ )X − C(Q)], (1)
where W > 0 is a fixed component of nominal income.
1The strict convexity of C(Q) is driven by the firm’s production technology that exhibits decreasing
returns to scale.
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Let F (P ) be the marginal cumulative distribution function (CDF) of P˜ over support
[P , P ] with 0 < P < P . Likewise, let G(Z) be the marginal CDF of Z˜ over support [Z,Z]
with 0 < Z < Z. To allow the price risk, P˜ , to be correlated with the inflation risk,
Z˜, denote H(P,Z) as their joint CDF over support [P , P ] × [Z,Z]. Define the following
function:
ED(P˜ |Z) =
∫ P
P
[
H(P,Z)
G(Z)
− F (P )
]
dP, (2)
for all Z ∈ [Z,Z]. According to Wright (1987), P˜ is negatively (positively) expectation de-
pendent on Z˜ if ED(P˜ |Z) ≤ (≥) 0 for all Z ∈ [Z,Z], where the inequality is strict for some
non-degenerate intervals. Wright (1987) shows that negative (positive) expectation depen-
dence is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for negative (positive) correlation. In the
sequel only the case wherein P˜ and Z˜ are negatively expectation dependent is considered.2
The firm is risk averse and possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U(Π),
defined over its real income at date 1, Π, with U ′(Π) > 0 and U ′′(Π) < 0 for all Π > 0. The
firm’s ex-ante decision problem at date 0 is to choose its output level, Q, and its forward
position, X, so as to maximize the expected utility of its real income at date 1:
max
Q≥0,X
E[U(Π˜)], (3)
where E(·) is the expectation operator with respect to H(P,Z), and Π˜ is given by Equation
(1). The first-order conditions for program (3) are given by
E{U ′(Π˜∗)Z˜[P˜ − C ′(Q∗)]} = 0, (4)
and
E[U ′(Π˜∗)Z˜(P f − P˜ )] = 0, (5)
where an asterisk (∗) signifies an optimal level. The second-order conditions for program
(3) are satisfied given that U ′′(Π) < 0 and C ′′(Q) > 0.
2The less likely case wherein P˜ and Z˜ are positively expectation dependent can be analogously analyzed.
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3 The impact of inflation risk
We assume that the forward price is assumed to be unbiased so that P f = E(P˜ ).3 The
firm’s optimal forward position, X∗, is said to be an over-hedge, a full-hedge, or an under-
hedge, depending on whether X∗ is greater than, equal to, or less than the optimal output
level, Q∗, respectively.
3.1 Hedging decision
Using the covariance operator, Cov(·, ·), with respect to H(P,Z), Equation (5) can be
written as4
Cov[U ′(Π˜∗)Z˜, P˜ ] = 0, (6)
since P f = E(P˜ ). Differentiating E[U(Π˜)] with respect to X and evaluating the resulting
derivative at Q = X = Q∗ yields
∂E[U(Π˜)]
∂X
∣∣∣∣
Q=X=Q∗
= −Cov{U ′[Π(Z˜)]Z˜, P˜}, (7)
where Π(Z˜) = Z˜[W + E(P˜ )Q∗ − C(Q∗)]. If the right-hand side of Equation (7) is positive
(negative), it follows immediately from Equation (6) and the second-order conditions for
program (3) that X∗ > (<) Q∗.
Cuadras (2002) proves that Cov[α(P˜ ), β(Z˜)] can be written in terms of the CDFs, F (P ),
G(Z), and H(P,Z), as follows:
Cov[α(P˜ ), β(Z˜)] =
∫ P
P
∫ Z
Z
[H(P,Z)− F (P )G(Z)] dα(P ) dβ(Z), (8)
3If P f > (<) E(P˜ ), the firm would have a pure speculative motive to sell (purchase) the forward contracts.
4For any two random variables, X˜ and Y˜ , it is true that Cov(X˜, Y˜ ) = E(X˜Y˜ )− E(X˜)E(Y˜ ).
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where α(·) and β(·) are functions of bounded variation. Using Equation (8) with α(P˜ ) = P˜
and β(Z˜) = U ′[Π(Z˜)]Z˜, the right-hand side of Equation (7) can be written as
−
∫ P
P
∫ Z
Z
[H(P,Z)− F (P )G(Z)]{U ′[Π(Z)] + U ′′[Π(Z)]Π(Z)} dP dZ
= −
∫ Z
Z
ED(P˜ |Z){1−R[Π(Z)]}U ′[Π(Z)]G(Z) dZ, (9)
where ED(P˜ |Z) is defined in Equation (2), and R(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π) for all Π > 0 is the
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. Since P˜ is negatively expectation dependent
on Z˜, ED(P˜ |Z) ≤ 0 for all Z ∈ [Z,Z]. The right-hand side of Equation (9) is positive
(negative) if R(Π) ≤ (≥) 1 for all Π > 0, thereby invoking the following proposition.5
Proposition 1. Given that the price risk, P˜ , is negatively expectation dependent on the
inflation risk, Z˜, the competitive firm that can sell its output forward at the unbiased
forward price, P f = E(P˜ ), optimally opts for an over-hedge (under-hedge), i.e., X∗ > (<
) Q∗, should the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, R(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π),
be no greater (larger) than unity for all Π > 0.
Proposition 1 generalizes the results of the literature to the case of expectation depen-
dence. The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Equation (6) implies that the optimal
forward position, X∗, is the one that makes the multiple of the firm’s marginal utility,
U ′(Π˜∗), and the inflation risk, Z˜, invariant to the price risk, P˜ . Since P˜ and Z˜ are neg-
atively correlated in the sense of expectation dependence, they are natural hedges against
each other. Starting with a full-hedge, the firm has a cross-hedging incentive that reduces
the firm’s forward position. Rewrite Equation (1) with P f = E(P˜ ) as
Π˜ = Z˜{W + E(P˜ )Q− C(Q) + [P˜ − E(P˜ )](Q−X)}, (10)
5If R(Π) = 1 for all Π > 0, i.e, the firm has a logarithmic utility function, the firm’s optimal forward
position is a full-hedge, i.e., X∗ = Q∗.
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It is evident from Equation (10) that an over-hedge decreases (increases) the firm’s nominal
income at date 1 as P increases (decreases), which is more likely when Z is lower (higher).
Given risk aversion, the over-hedge is more effective in reducing the variability of U ′(Π˜∗)Z˜.
Since the elasticity of the firm’s marginal utility is gauged by the Arrow-Pratt measure of
relative risk aversion, R(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π), the firm’s marginal utility is insensitive
(sensitive) to the price risk if R(Π) is small (large). The cross-hedging incentive is therefore
stronger (weaker) if R(Π) is small (large). Taking expectations on both sides of Equation
(10) yields
E(Π˜) = W + E(P˜ )Q− C(Q) + Cov(P˜ , Z˜)(Q−X). (11)
As is evident from the last term on the right-hand side of Equation (11), an over-hedge
increases the firm’s expected real income at date 1 since Cov(P˜ , Z˜) < 0. This gives rise
to a speculative incentive that induces the firm to opt for an over-hedge. This speculative
incentive is stronger (weaker) if the firm is less (more) risk averse, which dominates (is
dominated by) the cross-hedging incentive, thereby rendering the optimality of an over-
hedge (under-hedge), if R(Π) ≤ (≥) 1 for all Π > 0.
3.2 Production decision
Substituting Eq. (5) with P f = E(P˜ ) into Eq. (4) yields C ′(Q∗) = E(P˜ ), which implies
that the separation theorem holds under the joint price and inflation risk. If the firm cannot
hedge against the price risk, i.e., X ≡ 0, the first-order condition for program (3) becomes
E
{
U ′{Z˜[W + P˜Q◦ − C(Q◦)]}Z˜[P˜ − C ′(Q◦)]
}
= 0, (12)
where Q◦ is the optimal output level when forward trading is not allowed. Differentiating
E[U(Π˜)] with respect to Q and evaluating the resulting derivative at Q = Q∗ and X = 0
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yields
∂E[U(Π˜)]
∂Q
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗,X=0
= E
{
U ′{Z˜[W + P˜Q∗ − C(Q∗)]}Z˜[P˜ − E(P˜ )]
}
, (13)
since C ′(Q∗) = E(P˜ ). If the right-hand side of Equation (13) is negative (positive), it
follows immediately from Equation (12) and the second-order conditions for program (3)
that Q◦ < (>) Q∗.
Differentiating E[U(Π˜)] with respect to X and evaluating the resulting derivative at
Q = Q∗ and X = 0 yields
∂E[U(Π˜)]
∂X
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗,X=0
= E
{
U ′{Z˜[W + P˜Q∗ − C(Q∗)]}Z˜[E(P˜ )− P˜ ]
}
. (14)
If X∗ > (<) 0, it follows from Equation (5) and the second-order conditions for program (3)
that the right-hand side of Equation (14) is positive (negative). Equations (13) and (14)
then imply that Q◦ < (>) Q∗ if X∗ > (<) 0, thereby invoking the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the competitive firm optimally sells (purchases) its output forward, i.e.,
X∗ > (<) 0, at the unbiased forward price, P f = E(P˜ ), under the joint price and inflation
risk, banning the firm from forward trading induces the firm to lower (raise) its optimal
output level, i.e., Q◦ < (>) Q∗.
From Proposition 1, X∗ > Q∗ if R(Π) ≤ 1 for all Π > 0. In this case, Q◦ < Q∗ since
X∗ > 0. On the other hand, X∗ < Q∗ if R(Π) ≥ 1 for all Π > 0. In this case, X∗ can be
positive or negative, and thus Q◦ can be smaller or greater than Q∗, respectively. These
results are consistent with those of Adam-Mu¨ller (2002a,b).
To see the intuition for Proposition 2, recast Equation (12) as
C ′(Q◦) = E(P˜ ) +
Cov
{
U ′{Z˜[W + P˜Q◦ − C(Q◦)]}Z˜, P˜
}
E
{
U ′{Z˜[W + P˜Q◦ − C(Q◦)]}Z˜
} . (15)
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Equation (15) states that the firm’s optimal output level, Q◦, is the one that equates the
marginal cost of production, C ′(Q◦), to the certainty equivalent output price that takes
the inflation risk and the firm’s preferences into account. Indeed, the second term on the
right-hand side of Equation (15) captures the price risk premium, which must be positive
(negative) if the firm optimally sells (purchases) its output forward, i.e., X∗ > (<) 0, at the
unbiased forward price, P f = E(P˜ ), thereby implying that Q◦ < (>) Q∗.
In the absence of the inflation risk, i.e., Z˜ ≡ 1, the price risk premium is unambiguously
negative since U ′′(Π) < 0. In this case, X∗ > 0 and thus Q◦ < Q∗, which is the well-known
result of Holthausen (1979). When the inflation risk prevails, the price risk premium can
be positive or negative. Since the elasticity of the firm’s marginal utility is gauged by the
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, R(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π), the firm’s marginal
utility is insensitive to the price risk if R(Π) is small. In this case, the price risk premium
is mainly driven by the covariance between P˜ and Z˜, which is negative. Hence, the firm
optimally produces less if R(Π) ≤ 1 for all Π > 0. To see that the price risk premium can be
positive if R(Π) is large, consider the case that Z˜ = 1/P˜ . The firm’s real income at date 1 is
then given by Q◦+ [W −C(Q◦)]/P , which decreases (increases) as P increases (decreases).
Given risk aversion, the firm’s marginal utility is positively correlated with the price risk.
The multiple of the firm’s marginal utility and the inflation risk is also positively correlated
with the price risk if R(Π) ≥ 1 + A(Π)Q◦ for all Π > 0, where A(Π) = −U ′′(Π)/U ′(Π) is
the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. This gives rise to a positive price risk
premium so that the firm optimally produces more when forward trading is banned.
4 Concluding remarks
This study examined the behavior of a competitive risk averse firm facing joint inflation
and price risk. When price risk is negatively correlated with the inflation risk in the sense
of expectation dependence, the firm optimally opts for an over-hedge if the firm’s coefficient
9
of relative risk aversion is everywhere no greater than unity. Furthermore it is shown
that banning the firm from forward trading may induce the firm to produce more or less,
depending on whether the price risk premium is positive or negative, respectively. While
the price risk premium is unambiguously negative in the absence of the inflation risk, it
is not the case when the inflation risk prevails. In addition this note demonstrates that
forward hedging needs not always promote production should firms take inflation seriously.
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